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ABSTRACT
This study analysed the consequences of deviation from the WHO case definition for the assessment of
patients with suspected severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in The Netherlands during 2003.
Between 17 March and 7 July 2003, as a result of dilemmas in balancing sensitivity and specificity, five
different case definitions were used. The patients referred for SARS assessment were analysed from a
public health perspective. None of the patients referred had SARS, based on serological and virological
criteria. Nevertheless, all 72 patients required thorough assessment and, depending on the results of the
assessment, institution of appropriate prevention and control measures. Changing case definitions
caused confusion in classifying cases. A centralised assessment of the reported cases by a team with
clinical and public health expertise (epidemiological and geographical risk assessment) is a practical
solution for addressing differences in applying case definitions. The burden of managing non-cases is an
important issue when allocating public health resources, and should be taken into account during the
preparation phase, rather than during an outbreak. This applies not only to SARS, but also to other
public health threats, such as pandemic influenza or a bioterrorist episode.
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INTRODUCTION
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) con-
fronted communicable disease professionals with
new dilemmas concerning the assessment and
management of suspect cases, because of an initial
lack of knowledge of the pathogen, its transmis-
sion route, its incubation period and its clinical
presentations. The sense of urgency increased
with evidence that the disease could spread easily
and that the clinical course could be severe [1–4].
Following the WHO global alert on 12 March 2003
and the WHO travel advisory notice on 15 March
2003, countries worldwide started reporting cases
[5,6]. In May 2003, the WHO revised the case
definitions of SARS [7], based on knowledge of
the disease available at that time. Early studies in
2003 showed a low sensitivity (26%) when using
the WHO criteria for clinical assessment of
patients before admission to a SARS clinic in a
region with extensive local transmission [8]. A
comparable low sensitivity (27%) and a much
lower positive predictive value were found when
screening patients before admission to a general
hospital in Singapore [9]. In the designated
screening centre for evaluation of possible SARS
cases in Singapore, the WHO case definitions
were found to be helpful at initial assessment,
despite an under-triage of 0.3% [10]. To address
the low sensitivity of the WHO criteria, research-
ers from Hong Kong developed a clinical predic-
tion rule for the emergency department [11].
Case definitions are used for different purpo-
ses, i.e., surveillance, clinical care, research and
service provision [12]. Their benefits and limita-
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tions in practice depend on their purpose, the
context in which they are used, and the skills of
the user. When formulating a case definition,
balancing sensitivity and specificity is crucial [13].
The initial emergence and spread of SARS in the
absence of specific diagnostic tests required that
physicians and public health authorities world-
wide formulate a set of criteria for separating
suspected or probable cases from non-cases. This
report describes the background, and the choices
made with respect to classification and manage-
ment, of patients referred for SARS assessment in
The Netherlands. The consequences of the use of
different case definitions for the reporting beha-
viour, patient management and evaluation of
public health interventions are highlighted. None
of the cases met the criteria for reporting to the
WHO according to the case definitions in force at
the time in The Netherlands. All cases were re-
evaluated on the basis of the latest case definition
from the WHO (1 May 2003) [7], and differences
with important public health consequences were
revealed.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Case definitions for suspect and probable cases of SARS in
The Netherlands
On 15 March 2003, the WHO issued a case definition for
SARS. The first Dutch case definition, dating from 17 March
2003 (Table 1), for surveillance purposes and comprehensive
clinical assessment, required obligatory radiographical evi-
dence of lung infiltrates consistent with pneumonia, and
well-defined epidemiological criteria for exposure (i.e., close
contact with an individual with severe respiratory disease in
the affected areas during the previous 10 days). This more
specific case definition was issued to avoid considering
SARS in the differential diagnosis of the expected large
number of patients with acute respiratory infections at a
time when the incidence of mild (common) respiratory
disease in travellers was high and the influenza season was
ongoing. General practitioners and clinicians were asked to
report suspect cases on a voluntary basis to the Dutch Public
Health Services. On 1 April 2003, mandatory SARS notifica-
tion was introduced. The Public Health Services were asked
to consult the National Co-ordination Centre for Outbreak
Management (LCI) for an assessment of SARS probability. In
the following weeks, four subsequent case definitions fol-
lowed in which, gradually, sensitivity increased (Table 1) at
the expense of specificity. The criteria for case definitions
and notification were evaluated on each occasion by mem-
bers of the Outbreak Management Team, who were respon-
sible for issuing scientific advice. Major factors in balancing
sensitivity and specificity were the severity of the clinical
course, the frequency of local transmission in affected areas,
and the level of contact with potentially infected individuals.
On 10 June 2003, the WHO case definition for a suspect case
(revised on 1 May 2003) was also adopted in The Nether-
lands for reporting patients for SARS assessment.
Cases
A retrospective descriptive analysis of the cases that were
reported for SARS assessment in The Netherlands during the
period 17 March to 7 July 2003 was conducted. Cases from
two datasets were used. One dataset included the cases
referred by regional public health physicians to the LCI. The
second source was the dataset from the SARS reference
laboratory in The Netherlands (Department of Virology,
Erasmus MC Rotterdam), to which clinical specimens were
sent. These cases were referred for SARS assessment on the
basis of their clinical status, travel-associated risk and ⁄ or
contact with suspect ⁄probable SARS cases. The referral by the
clinician ⁄public physician was compared retrospectively with
the assessment on the basis of the Dutch case definition at the
time of submission, and with a reassessment on the basis of the
WHO case definition issued on 1 May 2003. The risk ratio (RR)
for being a suspect case was calculated by comparing the
referral of the case by the clinician with the first assessment
(RR1), the referral with the reassessment based on the WHO
definition (1 May 2003) (RR2), and the first assessment with the
reassessment (RR3). The data sources were compared using a
capture–recapture method [14]. The same classification of
cases was used for both data sources. Cases common in both
data sources were identified using date of birth, date of onset,
gender and city of residence.
Laboratory methods
Bacteriological cultures were performed on respiratory spec-
imens in the referring hospitals. In the reference laboratory,
serological testing for antibodies against SARS-coronavirus
Table 1. Criteria for the definition of cases of SARS in The Netherlands during 2003
Case
definition
(date) Fever >38C
Cough and
breathing
difficulty
Contact with patient with
severe respiratory disease
(in SARS area)
Travel to or
residence in
known SARS area
Contact with
SARS patient
outside affected area
Radiographical evidence
of lung infiltrates
(pneumonia)
1 (17 March) + + +a – – +
2 (1 April) + + +b – – –
3 (9 April) + + +c or +d – +
4 (2 May) + + +c or +d or + +
5 (10 June) + + + or + or + –
+, obligatory criterion; –, not an obligatory criterion for SARS assessment and notification.
aHong Kong, Guangdong, Hanoi (Vietnam).
bHong Kong, Guangdong, Hanoi (Vietnam) + China (Beijing, Shanxi), Taiwan, Singapore, Toronto and other affected areas with local transmission.
cIn areas with local transmission, but without travel advice (Hong Kong and Guangdong thus not included).
dAreas with a travel advice at that time.
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(SARS-CoV) was carried out, and virus culture was performed
in a category 3 biological safety laboratory facility, where the
samples were also prepared for PCR testing.
Serology
Acute sera and, where possible, convalescent sera were tested
for the presence of antibodies against SARS-CoV. The method
used was an indirect immunofluorescence assay in which
SARS-CoV-infected Vero 118 cells that had developed a
cytopathic effect were used to coat microscope slides. Serum
was diluted in serial two-fold steps from 1:10 to 1:40 in
phosphate-buffered saline. After incubation with dilutions of
the serum for 30 min at 37C, the slides were washed with
phosphate-buffered saline and incubated with rabbit anti-
human IgG, IgA and IgM conjugated with fluorescein thiocy-
anate (Dako, Heverlee, Belgium). After washing and drying,
the slides were examined with a fluorescence microscope [15].
The titre was defined as the highest dilution giving a 1+ or 2+
reaction.
Virus culture
Nose, throat and sputum specimens were tested specifically
for respiratory viruses, including influenza A and B viruses,
human respiratory syncytial virus, human parainfluenza virus
types 1–4, adenovirus, human metapneumovirus and rhino-
virus. Routine virological tests for respiratory pathogens were
performed by a combination of virus isolation in cell cultures
and immunofluorescence [16]. Virus isolation procedures for
SARS-CoV were performed following inoculation of speci-
mens on Vero 118 cells, a subclone from Vero 6 cells, human
embryonic lung fibroblasts and tertiary monkey kidney cells.
The presence of virus was confirmed by immunofluorescence,
RT-PCR, or both.
PCR testing
Virus nucleic acid was purified using the Magna Pure LC
automated nucleic acid isolation system (Roche Diagnostics,
Mannheim, Germany). Swabs, bronchoalveolar lavages and
sputum samples were processed with the Magna Pure LC
Total nucleic acid serum plasma blood isolation kit. The
presence of SARS-CoV RNA was assessed on an ABI Prism
7700 using the EZ rTtH RNA amplification kit (Applied
Biosystems, Nieuwerkerk a ⁄d IJssel, The Netherlands) [15].
RT-PCR with primers and a probe specific for the nucleopro-
tein gene of SARS-CoV was used, as such an assay may be
more sensitive than RT-PCRs based on the polymerase gene
[15,17]. Specimens from the respiratory tract were also mon-
itored for influenza A and B viruses, human respiratory
syncytial viruses A and B, rhinoviruses, coronaviruses (OC43
and 229E) and human metapneumovirus, using essentially the
same methods with specific primers [18,19].
RESULTS
Descriptive analysis
Between 17 March and 7 July 2003, 72 patients (43
males and 29 females) were referred for further
SARS assessment. The LCI was consulted for 51
patients (source A), and the reference laboratory
for 37 patients (source B). Sixteen patients were
reported to both the LCI and the reference
laboratory. Patients referred for SARS assessment
to the LCI (source A) were referred mainly by
public health officers (49 ⁄ 51), while clinicians
referred suspect patients directly to the reference
laboratory (35 ⁄ 37).
The date of onset of illness was known for 55
patients. The time between onset and referral
varied from 0 to 40 days, with a mean of 4.5
(median 3) days. Same or next-day referral
occurred for one-third of the patients. Three
patients were referred ‡2 weeks after the onset
of illness, with a maximum of 40 days (one case).
The distributions of the clinical and epidemiolog-
ical criteria for SARS among the referred patients
are listed in Table 2. The patients with no history
of travel to a SARS-affected area had travelled to
other countries in south-east Asia. Six patients
had no history of travel, but fulfilled, according to
the physician, at least one clinical criterion for
SARS, and had a risk of exposure in The Neth-
erlands through close contact with travellers from
affected areas.
Assessment and reassessment of presentations
by general practitioners and clinicians
As presented, there were 52 (72.2%; 95% CI 60.4–
82.1%) suspect cases and 20 (27.8%; 95% CI 17.9–
39.6%) cases that were not suspect, but which had
an indication for further assessment. The category
‘not suspect with an indication for further assess-
ment’ included cases in which not all the criteria
for classification as a SARS suspect case were met,
Table 2. Distribution of the criteria for the SARS case
definition among cases referred for SARS assessment
(n = 72)
Criteria
Number (%)
n = 72 95% CI
Respiratory illness 53 (71) 61.9–83.3
Fever 49 (68) 56–78.6
Travel-associated risk 46 (64) 52.8–75.3
Close contact with
individuals from
affected areas
17 (23) 13.2–37.7
Pneumonia 11 (19.3) 10–31.9
Diarrhoea 4 (5.6) 1.5–13.6
Fever and
travel-associated risk
28 (38.8) 27.8–50.2
Respiratory disease
and travel-associated risk
29 (40.2) 28.9–51.5
Respiratory disease
and fever
42 (58.3) 46.9–69.9
Respiratory disease,
fever and travel-associated risk
25 (34) 23.3–45.2
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but in which the reporting physician could not
rule out SARS without further assessment. Sus-
pect cases were divided equally between males
and females.
The assessment of the cases on the basis of the
Dutch case definition in force at the time was
compared with a retrospective reassessment on
the basis of theWHO case definition of 1 May 2003
(Table 3). There was no significant difference
between the risk of being a suspect ⁄probable case
at presentation vs. the risk following reassessment
based on the WHO case definition (p 0.14), but
there was a significant difference between the risk
of being a suspect case at presentation and the risk
in the first assessment based on the more precise
case definition (RR1 1.46; p <0.05 by Fisher’s exact
test) used at that time in The Netherlands. The risk
of being a suspect case was significantly higher
in the reassessment than in the first assessment
when the more specific case definition was used
(RR3 = 4.5; p <0.001 by Fisher’s exact test).
Laboratory outcomes
Virological investigations were performed on 37
patients, who presented as 33 suspect and four
not-suspect cases. The same cases were catego-
rised at the first assessment as seven suspect and
30 not-suspect. According to the WHO case
definition used in the retrospective reassessment,
the cases would have been divided into 12
suspect, 24 not-suspect and one probable. Anti-
bodies to SARS-CoV were not detected in any of
the acute sera. Convalescent sera from six patients
were also tested for antibodies to SARS-CoV, but
all were negative. Virus culture and RT-PCR
testing for SARS on respiratory samples (16
patients) were also negative. Other viruses were
detected in nine patients: influenza A in four,
influenza B in one, rhinovirus in two, adenovirus
in one and cytomegalovirus in one.
Case management
Six patientswere put in strict hospital isolation [20]
and seven were isolated at home until the labor-
atory results or the clinical course of the patient
ruled out suspicion of SARS. Droplet and contact
isolation precautions were advised for patients in
home isolation. Unprotected carers and contacts of
these patients were traced, and the intensity of
their exposure was assessed. When necessary,
body temperatures were monitored. For eight
patients, restriction of contacts outside the house-
hold was advised in order to increase their social
distance (e.g., by exclusion from work and social
events), but isolation was not considered to be
necessary. All suspect cases were given advice on
respiratory hygiene and contact precautions.
DISCUSSION
Mandatory notification of SARS was introduced in
The Netherlands a few weeks after the worldwide
alert, and proved to be a valuable instrument, since
most (78.2%) of the suspect patients were reported
within 5 days of the onset of respiratory disease.
Nevertheless, no date of onset was recorded for 17
of the patients, suggesting that data collection
could be improved, especially as one of these
patients was later reclassified as suspect. During
the worldwide SARS epidemic in 2003, five case
definitions were subsequently used in The Neth-
erlands. The latest, used from 10 June onwards,
was identical to that issued by the WHO on 1 May
2003. The three major criteria for SARS (i.e.,
respiratory disease, fever and travel-associated
risk) were met in 25 (34%) cases. Of these, two
patients had spent just a few hours in an airport in
an affected area, and another two patients became
ill outside the incubation period. Using the most
sensitive case definition (WHO, 1 May 2003), 21
cases would have been considered as suspect, and
two (2.8%) patients would have qualified as
probable cases. These cases were not reported to
the WHO because, at the time of their assessment,
they did not meet the criteria for probable cases
according to the prevailing Dutch case definition.
With strict application of the specific case
definitions issued in The Netherlands (before
adopting the WHO version on 10 June 2003), only
nine cases would have been defined as suspect
cases requiring SARS assessment. In reality,
despite the case definitions used, 52 cases were
Table 3. Comparison of cases on the basis of the first
assessment (based on the current Dutch case definition)
and the retrospective reassessment (based on the WHO
case definition)
First assessment
Retrospective reassessment
Not-suspect Suspect Probable Total
Not-suspect 49 14 0 63
Suspect 0 7 2 9
Probable 0 0 0 0
Total 49 21 2 72
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considered to be suspect by the clinician or the
local public health officer. In the UK, over 400
cases were referred for assessment, among which
four probable cases were identified [21]. In
France, 437 cases were notified, with seven being
classified as probable cases, among which four
were later confirmed as being infected with SARS-
CoV [22].
The Netherlands was not a country affected by
SARS, and there was no local transmission. SARS
was ruled out on the basis of the criteria in force at
that time. As soon as SARS-specific diagnostic tests
became available, they were used on samples from
37 patients. Acute sera taken early in the course of
the infection can result in false-negative serological
results unless convalescent sera are also analysed
at a later date. Negative serology was not the only
criterion for ruling out SARS; discharge from
observation took place only when the clinical
course improved and ⁄ or an alternative diagnosis
could fully explain the illness.
Although inevitable following the gradual
accumulation of knowledge during the SARS
outbreak, the changes in case definitions during
the epidemic caused confusion in the manage-
ment of individual cases. Subsequently, greater
knowledge of the disease has revealed that
transmission occurred mainly within hospitals
caring for seriously-ill patients. The severity of the
disease (pneumonia or respiratory distress syn-
drome) is an important criterion for including
patients in the suspect group, and for referring
them for further assessment in countries consid-
ered to be at low risk according to the WHO
classification [23]. To increase the assessment
specificity, the inclusion of significant travel
exposure (i.e., contact with a person suffering
from respiratory disease in areas with local
transmission) or hospital exposure (i.e., the
patient has been hospitalised or has been working
in a risk area for SARS) should be obligatory
when considering SARS in patients returning
from abroad. Issartel et al. [24] concluded that
contact exposure seemed to be one of the best
criteria for identifying cases of suspected SARS.
A limitation of the present study is that, in the
absence of confirmed SARS cases in The Nether-
lands, it is not possible to identify with certainty
which components of the criteria for SARS assess-
ment would be crucial in identifying genuine
cases. In the early stages of SARS (or during a new
incident), the vital diagnostic features will emerge
only with time, and the criteria for separating
cases from non-cases will initially be imprecise.
Continuous vigilance by healthcare professionals
and public services will provide the basis for
identifying possible cases. From a public health
point of view, in order to prevent the medical
services from becoming overwhelmed, a first-line
filter is needed to separate suspect cases from not-
suspect cases before referring patients for further
assessment. The first-line filter will be based on
broad clinical and epidemiological criteria (e.g.,
history of contact and travel exposure) and will be
refined gradually as knowledge concerning this
disease becomes available.
Education of health professionals in the use of
case definitions is needed before the event. Risk
assessment and case classification should be done
by individuals with experience in working with
SARS case definitions. This could be achieved
within a centralised surveillance and assessment
system by an expert team with clinical and public
health expertise (i.e., knowledge of the epidemi-
ological features of the disease and the availability
of necessary additional resources) [25]. This
expert team, with both the necessary experience
and the authority to confirm the suspicion, should
be available at all times. Centralised assessment is
appropriate as long as there are only imported
cases, or local transmission remains at a low level.
This approach might have limitations for coun-
tries in which a delay in isolating patients could
occur because of large distances between hospi-
tals. This is undesirable because shortening the
period between the onset of symptoms and
isolation, and proper management of contacts,
have proven to be effective in containing SARS.
The risk of secondary transmission has been
shown to decrease significantly when cases are
isolated within 3 days of the onset of symptoms
[26,27]. Telephone or online consultation with the
expert team is a useful option.
In the coming years, and particularly during
the seasonal increase in respiratory disease in
autumn, the burden of managing non-SARS cases
will be high, and public anxiety should not be
increased unnecessarily by the use of a case
definition that is overly non-specific for a country
at low risk. A possible disadvantage of using too
narrow a case definition is that missed cases could
prove to be super-spreaders. This risk will come
from unrecognised cases; however, sub-clinical
infections seldom occur, and significant virus
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shedding with secondary transmission has been
documented mainly in the second week after the
onset of disease [28,29].
Individual situations vary, and no single set of
assessment criteria can be applied to all settings.
Some of the dilemmas encountered with SARS
will reappear when worldwide threats provided
by pandemic influenza, (re)emerging pathogens
or bioterrorism occur. Compared with other
infectious diseases, SARS has an estimated low
R0 (basic reproduction number) [26], and trans-
mission is confined mostly to spread from overt
clinical cases. The extent of transmission of
influenza by sub-clinical cases during a pandemic
is difficult to predict, and in such a situation,
timely preparedness and proper allocation of
resources to manage both suspect cases and
non-cases, and their contacts, are important. The
danger of over-reporting cases should be taken
into account when estimating and planning epi-
demic control resources before an outbreak
occurs. The costs of managing non-cases should
not be underestimated, as they require thorough
assessment and the instigation of public health
measures, thereby increasing existing workloads.
Both within the process of scientific advice and
the preparation of outbreak plans, the conse-
quences of the various case definitions should be
considered, in addition to the training of profes-
sionals in applying case definitions to their
patients. A first-line filter for separating non-cases
from suspect cases should be followed by consul-
tation with a centre of expertise, bearing in mind
that the balance between the need to classify and
manage cases correctly and the need to allay
public anxiety quickly could be delicate.
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